This is not a conclusive proof of Russian direction in that particular case, but it is a worrying sign: the logic of media impersonation, covert advertising, and propaganda disguised as news has already taken root in the region and reproduces methods that are too reminiscent of the architecture of information poisoning perfected by Moscow. The operation is called Doppelganger, and both the U.S. Department of Justice and European governments and specialized centers identify it as one of the most aggressive campaigns of the Russian information manipulation apparatus since the invasion launched by Vladimir Putin in February 2022. The mechanism is as simple as it is venomous: to almost perfectly copy the appearance of legitimate media, create domains nearly identical to the originals, publish articles fabricated in Russian and translated into different languages, and then amplify that material through bots, inauthentic accounts, paid ads, fabricated influencers, and content generated or retouched with artificial intelligence. The EU and the UK reacted with sanctions: the Council of the European Union imposed restrictions for information manipulation actions linked to the war against Ukraine, and London sanctioned in October 2024 three Russian agencies and executives linked to these operations, maintaining that the SDA received tasks and funding directly from the Russian state. The political dimension of this machinery was once again exposed in the German federal campaign of February 2025. CeMAS detected 630 German-language messages between mid-December and mid-January with patterns compatible with Doppelganger, in an offensive that sought to discredit The Greens, the SPD of Olaf Scholz, and the CDU, while pushing favorable messages for the far-right AfD. The German center CeMAS described Doppelganger as a covert influence operation coordinated with the Russian presidential administration, active in Germany during 2024 and aimed at manipulating public opinion in Ukraine, the European Union, the United States, and other countries. The U.S. Department of Justice reported in September 2024 the seizure of 32 domains used by this network and stated that the Russian firms Social Design Agency, Structure, and ANO Dialogo operated under the direction of the Russian presidential administration, particularly the environment of Sergei Kiriyenko, with the objective of reducing international support for Ukraine, promoting pro-Russian interests, and even influencing elections in the United States and other countries. The operational heart of the scheme is the Social Design Agency, identified in judicial documents and European reports as a professionalized factory of black propaganda. That is why the European Parliament warned in January 2025 that Russian disinformation is not a collateral damage of the war, but a central tool to justify aggression against Ukraine, falsify history, and hit European democratic processes. The concern is no longer limited to Europe. Buenos Aires - March 25, 2026 - Total News Agency - TNA - The Kremlin's hybrid war is not fought only with troops, missiles, or energy blackmail. The operation was associated with FG Medios SA, based in Buenos Aires, and several of the presenters identified were actors and models residing in Argentina. Infobae also reported that the operation accumulated more than 32 million views, used real media content without authorization, and that a line of journalistic investigation also pointed to QSocial as a possible gear in the production. It also deploys with a sophisticated disinformation structure that falsifies news portals, impersonates media identities, artificially inflates narratives favorable to Moscow, and seeks to erode Western support for Ukraine. In recent days, an investigation by Cazadores de Fake News and Chequeado detected in Latin America a network of at least 14 YouTube channels that broadcast 55 paid, unlisted videos with the aesthetic of news programs from different countries to improve the image of Delcy RodrÃguez. The same work showed how the network distributed pro-Russian content on X and Facebook through inauthentic accounts. The method was the same: falsification of sites, a carbon copy of the aesthetics of recognized media brands, and automated amplification to simulate legitimacy.
